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I.

INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Franklin famously quipped: "in this world, nothing can be said to be certain,
except death and taxes." Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (13 Nov. 1789),
in 10 THE WRITINGS

OF

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 68-69 (Albert Smith, ed.) (1907). If only that

were the case here, where Respondent Andrew Hawes' 2005-2008 tax records unequivocally
demonstrate that his employer was Blixseth Group, Inc. ("BGI"), not Appellant Western Pacific
Timber ("WPT"). Hawes never addresses this "certain" fact, instead, arguing that "substantial
and competent" evidence was presented at trial to support his claim that WPT-in 2005employed him and agreed to pay him up to $500,000 in severance as enticement for his leaving
private practice. This is simply untrue.
The entirety of Hawes' case relies on his unsubstantiated and self-serving testimony that
WPT owes him a half-million dollars. Hawes was allowed to so testify, over WPT's objection,
without providing foundation that Tim Blixseth ("Blixseth")-who allegedly made such oral
promise-did so on behalf of WPT, as compared to on his own behalf, or, as the documents
admitted at trial demonstrate, on behalf of BGI. Put another way, without Hawes being able to
testify that Blixseth intended to bind WPT in 2005 to a half-million dollar liability, there is
literally no competent evidence in the record to support such claim. There is no evidence that
there was a "meeting of the minds" in 2005 on the essential elements of the oral agreement, and,
more specifically, who were the parties to such agreement sufficient to create an onerous, and
admittedly undisclosed, obligation upon WPT in 2017.
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In the face of such evidence, what is a reasonable employer to do when an at-will
employee is terminated and claims that he is entitled to a half-million dollars in severance and
directs the employer to "look in his file"? A reasonable employer would immediately check the
employee's file for evidence of any severance agreement. If none is found, the employer is not
required to offer severance, but may choose to do so anyway. That is exactly what happened
here. When WPT terminated Hawes they were unexpectedly faced with a $500,000 severance
demand and told to look in his personnel file. When they did so, WPT found an unexecuted
agreement set up for signature by "Tim Blixseth" individually and employment paperwork that
referenced an agreement with "Mr. Blixseth"-not WPT. Then, WPT did what any reasonably
employer would do, they asked Hawes to provide a copy of the agreement he was relying on for
his $500,000 demand.

Hawes could not, but continued to argue he had a written contract

entitling him to such amounts. Without evidence of a written agreement, WPT offered Hawes
(without any legal obligation to do so) a generous severance package of $50,000 and the ability
to continue providing legal services to WPT for a period of 6 months, plus letters of
recommendation. At trial, the district court used these good faith efforts to punish WPT by
assessing significant discretionary attorney's fees against WPT based on a contingency fee
agreement and the trebled $500,000 severance award.

The district court did so without

meaningful analysis of the case law and Rule 54 factors, resulting in an abuse of discretion and
an entirely unwarranted, unfair and punitive judgment against WPT. Such actions would put
most Idaho employers out of business.
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If the judgment below is not reversed, it will have a significant adverse impact on

employers in Idaho for several reasons. First, it will allow employees who are employed by
individuals with more than one business to claim, without any written documents or
corroborating evidence, that an entity other than the one listed on their W-2s is their true
"employer" and owes them substantial sums in severance. Second, it will tell Idaho employers
that they cannot rely on payroll and tax records to evaluate their financial and legal obligations
(particularly when such obligations are specifically hidden from them). And, third, it will stand
for the amorphous proposition that a binding, contractual employment relationship begins "when
the parties agree"-even if an employer routinely requires a prospective employee complete
numerous pre-employment conditions and show up for work before an employment relationship
can begin. None of these propositions are good for Idaho employers.
As set forth below, WPT has provided this Court with authority justifying the reversal of
the judgments entered by the district court both as to liability and the award of attorney's fees.

II.

REBUTTAL OF HAWES' STATEMENT OF FACTS

Hawes' Statement of Pacts primarily relies on his own testimony to establish the timeline
and specifics related to his alleged oral agreement with Blixseth and subsequent employment
history. By ignoring key documentary evidence, Hawes attempts to skew the narrative in support
of his incomplete and inaccurate version of the facts. The following facts, supported by the
documents admitted at trial (often in Hawes' own handwriting), establish the accurate time line of
events related to Hawes' employment by Blixseth, including that in 2005, Blixseth hired Hawes
as a BGI employee to provide legal services for multiple Blixseth Group affiliates (including

3

WPT) and that WPT did not employ Hawes until December 2009.

A.

BGI Employed Hawes from 2005 to 2008.
1.

The Proposed Employment Terms and Written Contract Drafted by Hawes
in July 2005 State his Employer is the Blixseth Group.

Hawes drafted a letter dated July 8, 2005, addressed to "Tim Blixseth, Chief Executive
Officer, The Blixseth Group." R. Ex. (Ex. 6) at 6; see also Trial Tr. (April 30, 2019) at 116: 17118: 14. The letter stated Hawes was writing Blixseth to "confirm the details" of his "offer of
employment to come work for The Blixseth Group ('Employer') ... " R. Ex. (Ex. 6) at 6. Three
days later, on July 11, 2005, Hawes emailed Blixseth a draft employment agreement, which
included revised and additional terms compared to the July 8, 2005 letter, including defining his
employer to be the "Company" (which is defined as "The Blixseth Group and its affiliates").
R. Ex. (Ex. 8) at 9-1 O; (Ex. 506) at 186-87.

2.

Multiple Pre-Employment Forms Completed by Hawes in July 2005 State he
was Hired by the Blixseth Group.

In July 2005, Hawes filled out multiple pre-employment forms, including an employee
application. All of the forms reference employment with "Blixseth Group" or "BGI" and make
no mention ofWPT (R. Ex. (Exs. 510-511) at 188-95), including the following:

APPLICATION FOR EIY.[pLOYMENT

Qll:t:WnV.T- ,01,I(:r, ?mQM. AID HlL'nl ~ ftCKnJT D:CSQJ:lalO.nCB C!ll n:11 USllS ~ ~ , COi.OJ;, U1%.J;o;iJ;QK,
IU, J.0.1, ~ . D:U.UU.n"f, 1'11Drcu. o:,i,i,1:nC111, .IIUffU STJ.'!"W Oil IDVU. CIR:DITATlCIK.

lfAflo,QJ, Q;UIIDII',

I PERSONAL
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R. Ex. (Ex. 510) at 188. 1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT
THE BLIXSETH GROUP, INC.
DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY
I have received my copy of The Blixseth Group, Inc. drug and/or alcohol

policy. I understand and agree that it is my responsibility to read and
familiarize myself with the policies and procedures contained in this policy. I

further understand that should I violate this policy, I will be subject to
disciplinary action, up to and including, tennination of employment.

Ai--J,i:,'-<..J

I

7

F

~We\

-----{>l!o
S7===-- _-_____J!L=======----'f_d
Employee's ·signa hire

oa

R. at 195.
3.

Hawes' Notation on his At Will Employee Statement References an
Employment Agreement With Blixseth, Not WPT.

As part of the pre-employment paperwork that Hawes completed, Hawes signed an "At
Will Employee Statement" on July 21, 2005. R. Ex. (Ex. 11) at 18. Hawes qualified his consent
to at-will employee status with the "Blixseth Companies" by noting it was subject to his
agreement with "Mr. Blixseth" concerning his terms of employment, as follows:
;t:. S-bj'e.c.+ ft

+h...+

.~;...., ..e~tP.f~1ot+

ttl H<. P---fv&f
b.. 1 (iV!.d J.:k +- v-,,-e._-e 11-1 yl1v_ Ti, l i 1--k.f.- "'
akll Vl/lv, ~ S" r -e ( ~ i: ~ -fv l.e_.i,,-f--"'t; VI
e yt-._() { "1 (Y\(i~
--\--(v.-11.s 4 vi.J ( "'"'-J d-,·,J.-,_..5
dF(,v~

@?

R. Ex. (Ex. 11) at 18.
1

Porcupine Creek was the name of Tim and Edra Blixseth's personal residence. Trial Tr.
(April 30, 2019) at 143: 18-22.
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4.

From 2005 to 2008, Hawes Provided Legal Services for Multiple Blixseth
Group Affiliates, Including Extensive International Travel Related to YCW
Acquiring Real Property Assets.

Hawes spends much time highlighting how much legal work he did for WPT during the
2005 to 2008 timeframe. Respondent's Br. at 23-25. WPT does not dispute this, in fact the
evidence produced at trial demonstrates that Hawes held himself out as counsel to multiple
Blixseth related entities during this time, including:

+

VE:LLOWSTONE:

Andrew E. Hawes
General Counsel
Vice President of YCW

CLU.5

•

WORLD

101 souni-",CAPITOL BOULEVARD
SUITE 1601
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

BLIXSETH
GROUI'. INC

p 208/947.0978
f

203/947.0980

ahawes@wptimber.com

WESTERt..; PACfFIC Tif'.IBER, LLC

R. Ex. (Ex. 569A) at 320; see also Trial Tr. (April 30, 2019) at 154:16-155:17; 160:6-162:17;

166:21-168:13; 169:3-171:18; 172:16-173:4; R. Ex. (Ex. 516) at 219 (Hawes traveled to France,
Scotland, Turks & Caicos Islands, and Mexico related to acquiring real property assets for
YCW). The testimony of Patrick Ratte ("Ratte") and John Lightner ("Lightner") cited by Hawes
indicating that Hawes served as General Counsel for WPT (see Respondent's Br. at 23-25) is
consistent with this arrangement, but does not go to the legal question of who his employer was
at the time. That question is squarely answered by the "certain" evidence contained in Hawes'
tax, payroll and personnel records which indicate that his employer was BGI. See, e.g., R. Ex.
(Ex. 534) at 242-52 and documents cited in § II.A.1-3, supra.
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5.

Hawes' Handwritten Employment History From his Personnel File States he
was Employed by Blixseth Group from 2005 to 2008.

Hawes' entire personnel file (containing a combination of records during his employment
with BGI, BGW and WPT) was admitted into evidence (R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 24-171), and it
contains an application with the following employment history as drafted by Hawes:
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 92.

Hawes, in his own handwriting, admits that "Blixseth Group, Inc." was

his employer from "8/1/05" to "8/12/08," and that he left his law firm in August 2005 to "pursue
[opportunity] with Blixseth Group." Id.
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6.

Hawes was on the Blixseth Group Payroll.

The BGI payroll was separate from the WPT payroll. 2 Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at
325: 12-22. Per Blixseth's express instruction to Ratte (BGI Controller), as described in an email
from Ratte dated August 31, 2005, Hawes and his paralegal were on the BGI payroll, and its
affiliates-WPT, Yellowstone Development and Yellowstone Club-were to reimburse BGI for
their share of the legal department's expenses. R. Ex. (Ex. 38) at 172.
7.

Hawes' Tax Records Confirm Blixseth Group, Inc. Employed Hawes From
2005 to 2008.

Hawes' tax records from 2005 through 2008 state his "Employer's name" is "Blixseth
Group Inc." See R. Ex. (Ex. 534) at 242-52.
B.

BGW Employed Hawes from 2008 to 2009.

In late 2007, Tim and Edra Blixseth divorced and split their assets, including BGI, which
resulted in Blixseth forming the entity Blixseth Group of Washington, LLC, which he owned
100% ("BGW"). Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at 31:13-32:13; 218:20-219:10.
Hawes' employment terminated with BGI on August 12, 2008, and he was employed by
BGW starting on August 13, 2008. R. Ex. (Ex. 13) at 22. Hawes filled out an application for
employment and related paperwork for BGW (R. Ex. (Ex. 13) at 20-23; R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 92),
including the following employment history (also addressed supra):

2

John Lightner (WPT controller) and Sue Henderson (WPT office manager), who both worked
for WPT in the Boise office from 2005 to 2007, testified that they were on the WPT payroll (and
never on BGI payroll) and that their W-2s stated WPT was their employer. Trial Tr. (May 1-2,
2019) at 326:2-9; 386:1-4.
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 92. Here, Hawes again admits he was first employed by BGW on "8/13/08"

and that he left employment with BGI to "transfer to BGW." Id. Hawes' following tax records
also reflect Hawes' change of employer from BGI to BGW in 2008:

Form w- .2 Wage and rax Statement 2008

Copy 2, ta tia fll1d with •IJf loyee::i -t~ r11t1.1rn hr JD

flDF 1'8fS 1181J1, aton, IIGII
eLIXSE'l'B (ffl.OUP lNC

t

CO

ti:i;;;;;;:;;;-=:;;;::==::::::-"Ti':::::::::~ ~~:-:d 71 534 S.NIARA :RlJ
RANCHO HIQ.Gi CA 32270-

15 Sltlr
ID

~ • ffllf lD. llt.

I 002921!i429MW

18 Sll!I! q,s. l{fi«, !I.e.
!104'1-I, 12

17 Sta11 l~um

11

1111

U -41

.oo

9

ual

Jll?i, tip,,. e!C.

IQI

ll

llllllt,

lffl, Ind • - -

AREIRIN I IAJIS
213,111:il!IOlf

101.TLABll Ol 97212

lU!a

01

&iplllfet'U..1110 IIO.

1l S. WAGU. ..._ Illa.

136242:8-7

S0,56.59

7SW. lnlta ta

11 I.IOill npt. fps. Ill.

11 Lfltll IIICIIDl 11X

ID lnllll, llffl8

3595 .95

(R. Ex. (Ex 534) at 244).
C.

WPT Employed Hawes From 2009 to 2017.

Effective December 21, 2009, Hawes' employment with BGW was terminated, and WPT
employed Hawes until January 2017. R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 148, 132-34; (Ex. 534) at 245 (Hawes'
2009 W-2s); Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at 43:4-23; 44: 13-19.
On December 24, 2009, Carolyn Wheeler (HR Manager for both BWG and WPT)
emailed Paychex, their payroll service company, stating, "we want to change Andrew Hawes
from Blixseth Group of Washington, LLC payroll to W estem Pacific Timber, LLC payroll for
201 O" and requested Paychex complete the change in December so Hawes could update his
insurance plan before the December 30, 2009 cutoff. R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 59; see also R. Ex.
(Ex. 35) at 69 (Wheeler informing Paychex on WPT letterhead that Hawes "transferred from our
other company Blixseth Group of Washington, LLC on 12-21-09"). Hawes' tax records confirm
that WPT did not employ Hawes until late December 2009. See R. Ex. (Ex 534) at 245-46
(Hawes' 2009 and 2010 W-2s).
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As late as June 16, 2011, Hawes continued to represent that his start date at WPT was not
until December 21, 2009, when he completed a Request for Verification of Employment related
to a loan application. In that same document, Hawes noted he "transferred from another
associated company(s) Blixseth Group of WA, LLC / Blixseth Group, Inc. - original hire date of
8-1-05." R. Ex. (Ex. 35) at 83.
III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Jury's Verdict on Hawes' Claim for an Oral Severance Agreement Was Not
Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence of a Meeting of the Minds on the
Essential Contract Terms.

Formation of a contract requires mutual assent-commonly referred to as the "meeting
of the minds." Bremer, LLC v. East Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho 736, 741, 316 P.3d
652, 657 (2013); Barry v. Pac. W. Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 831, 103 P.3d 440, 444 (2004).
"[M]utual assent or a 'meeting of the minds' must occur on every material term in the contract"
in order to be enforceable. Bremer, 155 Idaho at 741, 316 P.3d at 657 (quoting Barry, 140 Idaho
827, 831, 103 P.3d 440, 444 (2004)). See also R. at 1241 (Jury Instruction No. 20) (instructing
jury that requirement of "meeting of the minds ... means that all parties to a contract must have
understood and accepted all of the essential terms of the contract.").
"In a dispute over contract formation it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a distinct
and common understanding between the parties." Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701,
703, 779 P.2d 15, 17 (1989). "Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation become
bound prior to the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal writing is largely a question
of intent . . . The intent of the parties to contract is determined by the surrounding facts and
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circumstances." Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, 159, 426 P.3d 1249, 1259
(2018).
As set forth below, Hawes failed to present substantial and competent evidence that:
(1) Hawes and Blixseth orally agreed on severance pay at their June 2005 dinner meeting; and
(2) that Blixseth intended for WPT to employ Hawes and be liable for up to $500,000 in
severance. 3 This Court will set aside a jury's verdict if it is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755,
758 (2011). "Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion." Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17,
278 P.3d 415, 419 (2012). The evidence supporting the jury's verdict must be "of such sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury
was proper." Mackay, 151 Idaho at 391,257 P.3d at 758 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
1.

There was no Competent Evidence for the Jury to Find That Hawes and
Blixseth Agreed on Severance Pay at Their June 2005 Dinner Meeting.

At trial, Hawes testified that his contract with WPT for $500,000 severance arises solely
out of an oral agreement that he and Blixseth reached at a dinner meeting in June 2005. Trial Tr.
(April 30, 2019) at 50:1-2 ("Q: So was the deal struck at this meeting? A: Yes."); see also id. at

3

Hawes complains that WPT did not "file a motion for JNOV nor any other post-trial motion
that related to the sufficiency of the evidence." Respondent's Br. at 17. Hawes did bring a
motion for directed verdict and timely appealed these issues. As such, under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(b )(3), the Court's consideration of these issues is proper. See I.R.C.P. 50(b)(3)
("The failure of a party to move for a directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or for a new trial does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence when
proper assignment of error is made in the appellate court").
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44:21-50: 10 (Hawes describing the essential terms of the contract, including a "severance
package" of "$100,000 per year for every year that [he] was with the company, up to five years"
and adamantly stating the agreement was with "Westem Pacific Timber"). Blixseth could not be
located by the parties during the course of the litigation, and he did not testify at trial. To
support his claim, Hawes points to his wife Gretchen (Respondent's Br. at 22), but she testified
that she was not present at the dinner meeting and has no personal knowledge of the alleged oral
agreement; her only knowledge is based on what her husband told her. Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019)
at 131:8-132:25.

Hawes' only other witness, Ratte (Respondent's Br. at 20), provided no

testimony related to the June 2005 dinner meeting or alleged oral agreement between Hawes and
Blixseth; Ratte was only aware of the proposed written employment agreement after the dinner
meeting (R. Ex. (Ex. 8) at 9-10) that Hawes drafted and Blixseth never signed. Trial Tr.
(May 1-2, 2019) at 161:5-20; 173:5-9; 197:22-198:10; 215:8-16. 4 Thus, the only evidence that
Hawes and Blixseth agreed to any severance package at the dinner meeting was Hawes' own
testimony about what Blixseth purportedly said at that meeting. Id. at 44: 1-50: 1O; see also
Respondent's Br. at 3-5. This evidence, alone, is neither competent nor substantial.
First, it is not competent evidence because Hawes was allowed to testify about Blixseth's
alleged out-court-statement without providing the requisite foundational evidence to support its
admission. As set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, the district court improperly admitted
Blixseth's statements (as solely described by Hawes) as an admission of a party opponent under

4

The district court found, on WPT's motion for summary judgment, that no written contract was
executed. Tr. (October 11, 2018) at 41:2-13.
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Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). See Appellant's Opening Brief at 34-36. In so doing,
however, the district court failed to require Hawes to establish foundation, apart from his own
testimony, sufficient to show that Blixseth was speaking on behalf of WPT when offering the
alleged severance pay (and not for himself personally or on behalf of any other Blixseth owned
entity, including BGI-the entity that initially employed Hawes pursuant to Hawes' tax records
and personnel file) so as to be considered an admission of a party opponent. See supra, § II.A.
Hawes claims that sufficient foundation was laid because all parties agree that Blixseth
was the sole owner of WPT in 2005 (Respondent's Br. at 36), but this misses the point. Blixseth
also was the owner of multiple other entities in 2005, including BGI and YCW, for which Hawes
acted as general counsel. Trial Tr. (April 30, 2019) at 125:3-130:21 (listing numerous entities
owned by Blixseth during the 2005-2007 timeframe, including many entities for which Hawes
performed legal work at Blixseth's request). Thus, it was particularly important in this case for
Hawes to present proper foundational evidence that Blixseth was speaking on behalf of WPT,
not any of his other entities. Indeed, if the Court were to apply Hawes' argument, any employer
that owns multiple affiliated entities could risk liability for all entities based on an oral
agreement only intended to bind a particular entity.
Second, such evidence, by itself, is not substantial. Indeed, the only evidence of an oral
severance agreement made during the June 2005 dinner with Hawes-a central and important
fact for this entire case-is Hawes' self-serving and uncorroborated testimony that it is so. And,
as indicated above, such testimony was improperly admitted.
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2.

There was No Competent Evidence for the Jury to Find That Blixseth
Intended for WPT to Employ Hawes and be Liable for up to $500,000
Severance.

As with the issue of whether a severance agreement was reached in June 2005, but even
more significantly, Hawes presented no competent or substantial evidence that Blixseth intended
WPT to be bound by the terms of such severance agreement.
It is black letter law that "[ a]n enforceable contract must be complete, definite, and

certain in all of the contract's material terms." Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation,

Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 592, 329 P.3d 368, 374 (2014). "A valid contract must be specific as to its
essential terms, and the essential terms include the identity of the parties to be bound." 17 C.J.S.
CONTRACTS § 46. See also P.O. Ventures v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233,
238, 159 P.3d 870, 875 (2007) (listing the essential elements for an enforceable contract,
including "identification of the parties involved").

Hawes repeatedly insists that the "three

essential terms of the agreement" (i.e., salary, severance and Hawes' continued service at Idaho
State Bar) were established at the June 5, 2005 dinner and never changed (Respondent's Br. at
21 ); but he makes no mention at all of who the parties to that agreement were.
Again, the only evidence offered on this central and essential element is Hawes'
testimony that the oral agreement was with "Western Pacific Timber" (Trial Tr. (April 30, 2019)
at 50:9-10). Apart from this, Hawes offered no evidence that Blixseth was acting on behalf of
WPT in hiring Hawes or making any agreement concerning severance. Hawes testified that
Blixseth emailed him in advance of their June 2005 dinner meeting "inquiring whether or not
[he] had an interest in joining Western Pacific Timber as an in-house attorney" (Id. at
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39:24-40:2; see also Respondent's Br. at 3), but no record of this alleged email communication
was produced. Notably, Hawes did produce numerous emails he had with Blixseth but they all
began in July 2005. See, e.g., R. Ex. (Ex. 7) at 8; (Ex. 10) at 11. Moreover, even if such email
communication existed, it would not be competent and substantial evidence concerning the
identity of the parties to an oral severance agreement made later. Hawes provides absolutely no
reference to any portion of the record to show that Blixseth intended to bind WPT to the June 5,
2005 severance agreement; instead, Hawes points to documents that he, himself, wrote at the
time and the testimony of Ratte indicating that the "agreement" was between Hawes and
"Mr. Blixseth" or "Tim." See Respondent's Br. at 18-21.
As previously noted, there is no dispute that during the timeframe of 2005 to 2008,
Hawes performed legal work for Blixseth personally5 and for multiple affiliated entities owned
by Blixseth, including WPT. This was confirmed by Blixseth in August 2005 when he instructed
Ratte (his "right-hand-man" and BGI controller) that since Hawes was on the BGI payroll, WPT
and other Blixseth affiliates should reimburse BGI for their share of the legal work done by
Hawes. 6 R. Ex. (Ex. 38) at 172. And, perhaps more definitively, it is confirmed by Hawes'

5

See Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at 77:7-19 (Hawes testifying that he "from time to time" provided
legal work for Blixseth personally and for Blixseth's children).
6

This undisputed evidence from Ratte answers the question of who Hawes was employed by at
the time and who he was instructed to perform legal services for. Such evidence is consistent
with Ratte's testimony that Hawes was "working for Western Pacific Timber" (Respondent's Br.
at 25) and Lightner' s testimony that Hawes served as General Counsel for WPT during this time.
Respondent's Br. at 25. Here, the significant fact is not what Hawes was doing during this time
but, rather, who Hawes was employed by during this time. That question is definitively answered
by Hawes' payroll and tax records as BGI.
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W-2s and tax returns which report that he was employed by "Blixseth Group, Inc." - an
undisputed fact completely ignored by Hawes before this Court and below.
Under these circumstances, the fact that Hawes performed some legal work for WPT in
2005 does not amount to either substantial or competent evidence that Blixseth intended to bind
WPT (or any of the multiple other Blixseth Group affiliates) to an agreement for $500,000
severance.

Without such evidence, the jury's verdict cannot stand because there was no

"meeting of the minds" on the parties to be bound to the oral severance agreement.
B.

There was Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support WPT's Affirmative
Defense of Equitable Estoppel.

Hawes asserts it was procedurally improper for WPT to address on appeal the sufficiency
of the evidence in support of WPT' s affirmative defense of equitable estoppel primarily because
WPT did not first file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under I.R.C.P. 50(b)
and/or motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59. See Respondent's Br. at 33. But, Hawes points to
no specific case law or other authority to support that proposition. Id.

Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(b) expressly states, "The failure of a party to move for a directed verdict, for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial does not preclude appellate review of the
sufficiency of the evidence when proper assignment of error is made in the appellate court."
I.R.C.P. 50(b)(3). Thus, Hawes' procedural argument does not appear well founded.
Moreover, while Hawes readily admits that he did not tell WPT's "new owners in 2012
about the severance agreement that was reached in 2005," Hawes claims his actions were
justified because he was "looking forward to moving forward with the company" and his
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"severance agreement simply had nothing to do with what was going on" with the change in
WPT's management. Respondent's Br. at 35-36. That is not how WPT saw things. As testified
by WPT owner James Dolan, the 2012 change in WPT management, where Blixseth was
suddenly no longer involved in the company, was precisely the critical time WPT needed and
requested Hawes disclose "everything" relevant to the obligations and concerns related to
running WPT. Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at 262:1-263:4. Had Hawes disclosed in 2012 his
alleged oral agreement with Blixseth, WPT could have immediately questioned Blixseth on the
existence of and parties to the agreement. WPT would also have had the opportunity to fully
evaluate whether it wanted to continue to employ Hawes, given the majority owner's concern
that Hawes was loyal to Blixseth and not WPT. Trial Tr. (May 1-2, 2019) at 260:8-263:4.
Instead, WPT continued to employ Hawes at a cost of over $850,000 7 and also has had to incur
the significant time and expense of defending this lawsuit brought to enforce an oral agreement
where the declarant who purportedly made the promise nearly 15 years ago cannot be located to
testify about what promises he did or did not make in August 2005.
C.

A New Trial is Required Because the District Court Erred in Instructing the Jury,
and WPT Suffered Significant Prejudice as a Result.
The district court erred when it decided to provide an off-the-cuff answer to the jury's

legal question of "What is the legal point at which a company or entity becomes a person's
employer?" during jury deliberations. Supp. R. 1344. Given that an employment relationship is
a contractual relationship that carries unique benefits and obligations not otherwise recognized in
7

Trial Tr. (May 3, 2019) at 25:10-14 (Hawes' yearly salary was $190,957); Trial Tr. (April 30,
2019) at 108:2-4 (Hawes' salary was the same from 2012 through 2017).
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the absence of such relationship (see, e.g., Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298,
301-02, 766 P.2d 768, 771-72 (1988) (Johnson, J., concurring)), the district court should have
directed the jury to the previously submitted jury instructions on contract formation to answer the
question of "when" such a contractual relationship begins or is formed. See R. 123 8 and 2141
(Jury Instruction Nos. 17 and 20). Indeed, that is precisely what WPT suggested at the time.
Trial Tr. (May 3, 2019) at 182: 11-13 ("you must determine that point based on concepts of
contract law that have been provided to you"). Or, the district court could have turned to the
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1932) which more directly provides: "A contract is
made when the last act necessary for its formation is done." Here, it is undisputed that Hawes
was required to complete a number of pre-employment forms and tasks before beginning work
on August 1, 2005-the date the "last act" necessary for an employment agreement to be done.
But, the district court did not provide the jury additional instruction consistent with the
Restatement. Instead, the district court ambiguously instructed the jury at the end of a long trial
and day: "The legal point of employment is when the parties agree." Supp. R. 1343. As set forth
in Appellant's Opening Brief, the district court's instruction is a misleading, incomplete and
incorrect statement of the law and is highly prejudicial to WPT. Moreover, it sets a dangerous
precedent for Idaho employers. If the Court agrees with Hawes that his employment was "not in
any way conditioned upon" sufficiently completing the pre-employment forms (Respondent's
Br. at 32), then an employer would be bound to employ any applicant who fails a preemployment drug screen or background check.
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This Court has long held that the mere possibility of prejudice is sufficient to trigger a
district court's duty to grant a new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l)(H).
"An erroneous jury instruction is prejudicial when it could have affected or did affect the
outcome of the trial." Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 542-43, 164 P.3d 819, 822-23 (2007)
(citing Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 119 Idaho 299, 306, 805 P.2d 1223, 1230
(1991)). The erroneous instruction allowed the jury to improperly conclude that Hawes became
an employee of WPT on June 5, 2005 after his "handshake" deal at dinner and, in the process,
ignore all of the undisputed documentary evidence indicating that Hawes became an employee of
BGI months later, on August 1, 2005. As such, the instruction most certainly "could have
affected the outcome of the trial." See Pierson v. Brooks, 155 Idaho 529, 534, 768 P.2d 792, 798
(Ct. App. 1989) ("[W]e believe that a new trial is available under Rule 59(a)(l) where, as here,
the court made an erroneous ruling and prejudice is likely. An appellate court need not attempt

to quantify the probability of a different result on retrial. It is sufficient that the error was
prejudicial and that it reasonably could have affected the outcome of the trial") (emphasis
added).
In response, Hawes claims that WPT did not object to the court's jury instruction and, in
any event, got exactly the instruction it asked for. Respondent's Br. at 25-29. A review of the
trial transcript reveals that neither assertion is correct. WPT consistently objected to the court's
(and Hawes') suggested answers to the jury and even whether any answer should be provided.
Trial Tr. (May 3, 2019) at 179-85; R. 1277 (indicating additional discussion of proposed jury
instruction that was not recorded by court reporter). Moreover, Hawes' citation of one line of a
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longer explanation of WPT's position on the specific instruction at issue is incomplete and
misleading. See Respondent's Br. at 27. A more accurate citation of WPT's position came
immediately before the district issued its instruction:
THE COURT: I won't give the answer which we all go by, which is:
Look at what the paystub says.
MS. GRASHAM: That's what I would say.
Trial Tr. (May 3, 2019) at 184:5-6 (emphasis added).
Finally, while Hawes offers a cursory critique of some of the cases cited by WPT, he
cannot point this Court to any authority to support the district court's instruction. See
Respondent's Br. at 31-33. Instead, Hawes summarily states that the instruction was proper and,
even if it was improper, the remaining instructions "fairly and adequately addressed" the jury's
question. Respondent's Br. at 29-30. Ironically, Hawes' counsel argued the exact opposite to the
district court when presented with the jury's question:
THE COURT: What it would say then would be: The legal point of
employment is when the parties agree. That date may be either a
specifically agreed-upon date or a date that can be inferred from the
commencement of work and the acceptance of that work.
MS. GRASHAM: I'm just going to object because I think this is
creating an issue that is not relevant and it's confusing and I have not had
any opportunity to research this particular issue after spending
significant time on the jury instructions.
THE COURT: If we were to do it precisely as they've asked it, it could
be: An entity becomes a person's employer when it agrees to employ the
person and the person commences work. I don't know, I'm not
comfortable with anything. I don't want to tell them to go to hell, but I'd
like to have something that sounds like an answer.
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MR. JANIS: I think it's fairly safe. I'm not speaking as an advocate
here, I'm taking a step back and looking at it. You can't just say 'go
look at the instructions.' The instructions definitely do not answer this
question. That is going to clearly lead to dysfunction and confusion.

That brings me right back to the same point, the legal point at which
employment - a person becomes employed is not answered by our
instructions.
Trial Tr. (May 3, 2019) at 181:10 -182:19 (emphasis added). The district court obviously agreed
with Hawes' counsel because it provided an answer to the jury's question. Having done so, the
district court was required to instruct the jury properly and consistent with the law. It did not,
and such failure caused WPT to suffer significant prejudice. Accordingly, the district court erred
in failing to grant WPT's motion for new trial.
D.

The District Court's Award of Attorney's Fees Should be Vacated Because the
District Court Abused its Discretion When it Failed to Consider and Apply Relevant
Case Law.
After trial, Hawes sought an award of discretionary attorney's fees under Idaho Code

§ 45-615 in the amount of 35% of the total Judgment entered ($1,639,726.80). WPT objected to
such an award, arguing that the trebling of the $500,000 award (plus costs) more than covered
Hawes' reasonably incurred expenses of bringing the matter, and any further award would be an
unreasonable windfall to him and unduly punitive to WPT. Appellant Br. at 40-43. After noting
that when it comes to including the trebled award or not in calculating an attorney fee award
under I.C. § 45-615, "there is no statute or case decision that mandates a result either way"
(Supp. R. at 1459), the district court awarded Hawes the full 35% in attorney's fees-based on
the trebled award-without any adjustments and without any discussion or consideration of the
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authorities presented by WPT. Instead, in less than three pages, the substitute district court judge
(who had not been involved in the case prior to trial for the two years of discovery and
dispositive motion practice) perfunctorily listed the Rule 54(e)(3) factors and held that
"[a]ttorney fees calculated at 35% on the Judgment amount are allowed." Supp. R. at 1461.
As recently set forth in Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018),
this Court reviews whether an award of attorney's fees made pursuant to Idaho's Wage Claim
Act was an abuse of discretion under a four-part inquiry of "[w ]hether the trial court:
"(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Id. at 873, 421 P.3d at
204. Here, the district court's attorney's fee award must be reversed as an abuse of discretion
under elements 3 and 4 because the district court failed to address and apply the relevant case
law cited by WPT and meaningfully apply the Rule 54(e)(3) factors in exercising its discretion.
Hawes argues that the district court's four page "written decision clearly speaks for
itself' but nonetheless offers his take on what the district court must have been thinking in
rendering the fee award although not specifically included therein. Respondent's Br. at 40. Such
editorializing is not part of the district court's decision and cannot cure an otherwise improper
decision. Indeed, neither the district court nor Hawes on appeal addresses the authorities cited
by WPT regarding when a discretionary award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 45-615 is appropriate-in the first instance-when a large underlying verdict has been trebled.
See Rodwell v. Serendipity, Inc., 99 Idaho 894, 895, 591 P.2d 141, 412 (1979); Hutchison v.
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Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 942-43, 950 P.2d 1275, 1281-282 (Ct. App. 1997); Gomez v. Mastec
N Am., Inc., 2006 WL 8446077 (D.Idaho, Dec. 13, 2006). See also Maroun v. Wyreless Sys.,
Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005) ("although the award of treble damages

[under LC. § 45-615(2)] does tend to penalize the employer, it also serves to fully compensate
the wage earning employee for the injury caused him by the delay he experiences in recovering
his withheld wage in a court of law and the expenses connected with the recovery"). Without
such an analysis-squarely raised below-the district court's attorney's fee decision is fatally
flawed and must be reversed.
In addition, the district court's attorney's fee decision fails because it did not reach its
decision by reason. While the district court took three months to issue its decision, the decision
itself is only four pages long and contains only a cursory listing of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors. It
does not include an engaged, reasoned analysis of any of them-other than the last "any other
factor." There, the district court judge-which only sat for the trial and was not involved in any
of the extensive pre-trial matters, including WPT's successful dismissal of Hawes' evolving
written employment agreement claim-claimed that WPT made no "reasonable offer of
settlement in this case" and instead merely offered its at-will employee a "scrap" with "no real
alternative but to go to trial" to justify his decision to award Hawes attorney's fees representing
35% of the total, trebled award. Supp. R. at 1461. Given that the undisputed record before the
Court was that WPT initially offered Hawes a severance package of $50,000, plus a $5,000
monthly retainer for six months, and a letter of recommendation when Hawes could not produce
any written agreement to support his claim for $500,000 severance (Trial Tr. (May 1, 2019) at
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87:12-92:12 (Hawes testimony); 283:18-286:6 (Dolan testimony)), the district court's
characterization is not supported by the record and demonstrates animus toward WPT. It is not
based on reason.
This Court's most recent reported decision awarding attorney's fees under LC. § 45-615
provides a stark contrast to the district court's attorney's fee decision here. In Lunneborg v. My
Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018), an employee sued his employer for breach of a

written employment agreement for failure to pay him $60,000 in severance upon termination.
The employer did not dispute the existence of the agreement or that it was a party to such
agreement. Instead, the employer claimed that severance was not due to the employee because
he was terminated for cause. The employee disputed that claim and, after a three-day court trial,
the court found that the employee was terminated without cause and, therefore, entitled to
$60,000 in severance. Id. at 862, 421 P.3d at 193. This amount was trebled to $180,000 under
the Idaho Wage Claim Act, and the employee sought an additional award of attorney's fees
under LC. § 45-615 and LC. § 12-120(3). In a 16-page memorandum decision, the trial court
held that the employee was entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of $160,000 as "reasonably
incurred in connection with the proceedings" pursuant to LC. §45-615 and LC. § 12-120(3). Id.
at 873, 421 P.3d at 204. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's award, noting that the
trial court had applied the correct legal standard and acted within the bounds of its discretion to
find that the employee was entitled to attorney's fees and then had meticulously gone through
each of the 12 factors in Rule 54(e)(3):
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In doing so, the court reduced the amount of fees incurred by Lunneborg
from $223,564.50 to $160,000. A reason for settling on the lesser, but
significant amount was because 1,042 hours of attorney fees were
incurred by Lunneborg. The court explicitly found this amount of time
was "shocking," reducing the total amount requested by over $60,000.
Id. at 873, 421 P.3d at 204. In other words, the trial court reviewed the record to determine the

"attorney's fees reasonably incurred in connection with the proceedings," as required by
LC. § 45-615, had set forth a "reasoned analysis of the twelve Rule 54(e)(3) factors" and,
therefore, "the amount of fees the court calculated was reached by understanding the legal
principles involved and exercising reason." Id. at 873, 421 P.3d at 873.
In contrast, the trial court below did not engage in an analysis of attorney's fees
"reasonably incurred in connection with the proceedings." LC. 45-615.

Indeed, a detailed

submission of time spent on all tasks and rates charged by Plaintiffs attorneys was not
provided-thus none could be reviewed for reasonableness of time actually incurred or rates
charged, as was done by the trial court in Lunneborg. Instead, the trial court merely accepted
Hawes' representation that he was entitled to 35% of the total trebled damages award
($1,639,726.80, R. 1258) and entered an additional Judgment against WPT in the amount of
$577,467.84 in attorney's fees ($573,904.38) and costs ($3,563.46). Supp. R. at 1463. In all,
this discretionary award amounts to a huge windfall to Hawes and is unduly harsh and punitive
to WPT. According, this Court should reverse the district court's attorney's fee award.
E.

Hawes is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal as WPT has Raised Good Faith
Arguments Concerning Novel Legal Issues.

Hawes requests this Court award him attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 45-615(2) and/or Idaho Code § 12-121 because "[t]he issues on this appeal are
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simply not well taken and have no legal support" and because WPT is "asking this Court to
second-guess the jury verdict." Respondent's Br. at 41. That is not the case. This Court should
decline to award Hawes additional fees and costs for the following reasons.
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides, "the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." LC. § 12-121; see also Teurlings v. Larson,
156 Idaho 65, 76, 320 P.3d 1224, 1234-35 (2014) (stating an "award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the
court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.") (citation omitted). Likewise, an
award under Idaho Code§ 45-615(2) (Idaho's Wage Claim Act) is discretionary.
Attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not appropriate unless "the position
advocated by the nonprevailing party is plainly fallacious and, therefore, not fairly debatable."
Assocs. Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987).

Attorney's fees will not be awarded for positions that are based on a good faith argument, even if
those arguments are unsuccessful. Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 401, 210 P.3d 75, 86
(2009). Further, "[w ]here a case involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should not be
granted under LC. § 12-121." Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 651, 115 P.3d 731, 742
(2005); see also Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013) (declining to award
attorney's fees under Section 12-121 even through much of the appellant's appeal "was riddled
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with mischaracterizations of the law and frivolous argument," since the "case presented a novel
issue" of constitutional law).
Here, this appeal presents numerous issues of first impression. Specifically, no Idaho case
has addressed the legal question of "at what point in time does an employer have the right to
control the work of another so as to form the employee/employer relationship?" (relating to the
erroneous instruction given to the jury during deliberations), and no Idaho case has addressed a
discretionary award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 45-615(2) in the context of a
contingency fee based on a percentage of the trebled damages. WPT also appeals a jury verdict
for breach of an oral agreement where the terms of the alleged agreement are based solely on
hearsay of an unavailable declarant who owned multiple affiliated entities, and where there was
no foundation laid, apart from the Plaintiffs own self-serving testimony, to establish which of
the many entities the declarant intended to bind when entering into the alleged agreement. No
prior Idaho case has addressed this unique circumstance. Given these many novel issues under
Idaho law, which WPT has raised in good faith, fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not
warranted. Further, awarding Hawes discretionary fees under Idaho Code § 12-245 (Idaho's
Wage Claim Act) on appeal is not warranted for the same reason the fee award was not
appropriate below-the trebled damages resulting in a judgment of over one and a half million
dollars is more than sufficient to compensate Hawes for his damages and litigation expenses.
Through April 9, 2020 (the date of this brief), the Judgment against WPT for breach of
the alleged oral agreement made by Blixseth has already accrued $111,321.73 in interest, for a
total judgment amount of $1,751,048.53 (plus future interest accruing at $331.33 per day). In
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addition, the Judgment for Fees and Costs has accrued $21,530.45 in interest, for a total
judgment amount of $598,998.29 (plus future interest accruing at $112.72 per day). With two
judgments totaling $2,350,046.82, and significant interest continuing to accrue, any further
award of fees and costs would constitute an unreasonable windfall to Hawes and too harshly
punish WPT.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, WPT has acted at all times in good faith and as any reasonable
employer would do under similar circumstances in dealing with Hawes. In addition, there is no
competent, let alone substantial, evidence to support a finding that WPT employed Hawes
beginning in 2005, and as part of its offered employment, agreed to pay him $500,000 in
severance. The IRS filings alone-that "certain" fact of life noted by Benjamin Franklinshould be a fatal blow to Hawes' claims against WPT as they clearly show that WPT did not
employ Hawes until December 2009.

Thus, any liability relating to the purported 2005

severance agreement does not properly lay with WPT. Moreover, given the district court's
erroneous after-hours jury instruction and subsequent improper award of significant attorney's
fees based on the trebled $500,000 judgment, WPT has and continues to suffer from an unduly
harsh and punitive decision that amounts to an unjust windfall to Hawes. Accordingly, WPT
respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's decisions as addressed herein.
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